TECH FOCUS AREAS: Cybersecurity TECHNOLOGY AREAS: Information Systems OBJECTIVE: Develop and implement a decentralized and distributed security solution on Urban Air Mobility (UAM) networks to enable incorruptible flight data communications and resiliency. DESCRIPTION: The vision to revolutionize air mobility such as agility prime [1] present exciting frontiers in modern aviation. As air traffic grows, there is a need for secure Urban Air Mobility (UAM) for air passenger and cargo transportation in and among commercial, civilian, and military locations. UAM offers the potential to create a faster, cleaner, safer, and more integrated transportation system. However, recent events have shown that modern unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are vulnerable to attack and subversion through buggy or sometimes malicious devices that are present on UAM communication networks, which increase the need for cyber awareness include UAVs in the airspace, development of the Automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B), and the risk of cyber intrusion [2]. The incident of a civilian UAV disrupting a major airport is one example of many incidents raising questions on the future of airspace security. While a civilian hobbyist might be ignorant of the impending harm, the situation could pose a threat to the air operations [3]. Therefore, a seamless trusted communication capability is important in both military and commercial operations for vehicle integrity [4]. The challenge is conventional enabling technologies mainly rely on a centralized system for data aggregation, sharing, and security policy enforcement; and it incurs critical issues related to bottleneck of data analysis, provenance, and consistency. Since air vehicles can be compromised at a single point yet effects can propagate across the entire UAM network, the Department of the Air Force (DAF) is looking for a solution to eliminate the single point of failure through a decentralized and distributed security validation to verify communications with certainty despite there being a valid node on the network acting maliciously. The DAF would like to see this technology applied on a UAV cellular intercommunication network that can perform validation of messages in a form of decentralized security distributed amongst air vehicle controllers as well as provide a sense of resiliency. PHASE I: In the first phase of this effort, the contractor shall design a decentralized and distributed security solution performing validation of communications on UAM networks. Evaluation tradeoffs of the type and source of vulnerabilities to be exploited for a wireless UAV network, considering both accidental and malicious events, should be examined. The technology shall have a low resource consumption, minimal latency, and enhanced security on the air vehicles and networks. The proof of concept should include modeling, simulation, and mathematical description towards a prototype solution in Phase II. PHASE II: Implement and demonstrate the concept developed in Phase I on practical wireless ad-hoc network (WANET) or mobile ad hoc network (MANET) for autonomous UAM network management and aircraft separation service of urban airspace using physical air vehicle controllers. The contractor shall test and evaluate the operation of the technology in a live air vehicle or systems integration lab (SIL) environment. The contractor shall verify the effectiveness of the technology by: (1) Showing other controllers reject valid but malicious messages sent by another controller (2) Performing penetration testing with an independent team to identify other attack vectors against the technology; and (3) Evaluating the solution to refine the initial design prototype to be used in relevant and/or operational environment settings to support all domain mission requirements. Key metrics would be the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data. PHASE III DUAL USE APPLICATIONS: The fundamental nature of AFOSR programs reflect the broad opportunity to commercialize science to both commercial and defense markets. Awardees will have the opportunity to integrate with prospective follow-on transition partners. The contractor will transition the solution to provide expanded mission capability to a broad range of potential Government and civilian users and alternate mission applications. NOTE: The technology within this topic is restricted under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), 22 CFR Parts 120-130, which controls the export and import of defense-related material and services, including export of sensitive technical data, or the Export Administration Regulation (EAR), 15 CFR Parts 730-774, which controls dual use items. Offerors must disclose any proposed use of foreign nationals (FNs), their country(ies) of origin, the type of visa or work permit possessed, and the proposed tasks intended for accomplishment by the FN(s) in accordance with section 5.4.c.(8) of the Announcement and within the AF Component-specific instructions. Offerors are advised foreign nationals proposed to perform on this topic may be restricted due to the technical data under US Export Control Laws. Please direct questions to the Air Force SBIR/STTR Contracting Officer, Ms. Kris Croake, kristina.croake@us.af.mil. REFERENCES: 1. Flying Cars Could Take Off Soon, if We Let the Military Help | WIRED 2. E. Blasch et al., "Cyber Awareness Trends in Avionics," 2019 IEEE/AIAA 38th Digital Avionics Systems Conference (DASC), San Diego, pp. 1-8, 2019. 3. Flying Cars: Urban Air Mobility Raises Safety Concerns, 2020. Available at: https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2020/7/7/urban-air-mobility-raises-safety-concerns 4. J. A. Maxa, R. Blaize and S. Longuy, "Security Challenges of Vehicle Recovery for Urban Air Mobility Contexts," 2019 IEEE/AIAA 38th Digital Avionics Systems Conference (DASC), 2019.
