Non-Standard Space Domain Information

OUSD (R&E) MODERNIZATION PRIORITY: Network Command, Control and Communications; Artificial Intelligence/Machine Learning TECHNOLOGY AREA(S): Space Platform; Battlespace The technology within this topic is restricted under the International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR), 22 CFR Parts 120-130, which controls the export and import of defense-related material and services, including export of sensitive technical data, or the Export Administration Regulation (EAR), 15 CFR Parts 730-774, which controls dual use items. Offerors must disclose any proposed use of foreign nationals (FNs), their country(ies) of origin, the type of visa or work permit possessed, and the statement of work (SOW) tasks intended for accomplishment by the FN(s) in accordance with the Announcement. Offerors are advised foreign nationals proposed to perform on this topic may be restricted due to the technical data under US Export Control Laws. Please direct questions to the Air Force SBIR/STTR HelpDesk: usaf.team@afsbirsttr.us. OBJECTIVE: Design, develop, and demonstrate information generation techniques to observe and deter hostile actions from non-standard threat vectors in the space domain. DESCRIPTION: As one of the 5 core competencies identified in US Space Force (USSF) Spacepower Doctrine, Space Domain Awareness of non-standard threat vectors (NSTVs) is essential to secure the ultimate high ground above the Earth to project military space power for deterrent and coercive objectives. The complex gravitational topology of the expanded Area of Regard (AOR), including the expansive domain beyond GEO, enables low-cost options for spacecraft to rapidly alter course and unexpectedly threaten terrestrial and space-based assets. Over the next 10 years the space domain will become more crowded and possibly contested. For example, currently, there are 39 funded missions planned for launch before 2030 that will reach Lunar distances originating from at least fourteen countries by means of non-standard trajectories. The United States (US) does not currently possess the capability to adequately monitor the space domain for all NSTVs. As a result, adversaries can unexpectedly threaten both terrestrial and space-based assets without attribution. The USSF needs new information generation techniques to establish a path forward to projecting Spacepower into the expanded AOR through Space Domain Awareness. This will enable Space Security through Deterrence and Combat power projection by alerting/supporting defensive operations and targeting/performing battle damage assessments on offensive operations. PHASE I: Develop simulation capabilities to model non-standard threat vectors and the expanded space domain AOR. Simulate a comprehensive and diverse set of NSTV models to evaluate different architecture concepts. Develop and evaluate an operations architecture and Concept of Operations (CONOPs) for generating actionable information on NSTVs. Develop conceptual approaches for incremental deployment of the architecture. Develop information processing techniques to generate actionable information on the NSTV threats. GFE is not anticipated. PHASE II: Perform additional modeling and simulation of the necessary systems and subsystems to quantify the Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) of all Key Enabling Technologies (KET). Develop a strategy with execution plan to mature each capability for a prototype system demonstration. Execute development necessary to rapidly mature each KET in the architecture. Through simulation or deployment to a relevant environment, demonstrate the ability to generate actionable information on NSTV threats on relevant timelines. GFE is not anticipated. PHASE III DUAL USE APPLICATIONS: Develop a strategy to transition prototype residual capabilities and incremental proliferation based on operational requirements. Develop and support an information dissemination strategy to ensure operator accessibility. Generate the necessary documentation to train operators to effectively and efficiently utilize the new information at operations centers. Support activities to ensure adequate operator training and sustainment of the information systems. Assist the government in quantifying the operational impact of additional technology proliferation and additional information. REFERENCES: United States Space Force, "Spacepower," Space Capstone Publication, Headquarters United States Space Force, June 2020. M. Bolden, T. Craychee and E. Griggs, "An Evaluation of Observing Constellation Orbit Stability, Low Signal-to-Noise, and the Too-Short-Arc Challenges in the Cislunar Domain," Advanced Maui Optical and Space Surveillance Technologies Conference, Maui, Hawaii, 2020. Trusted Space, Inc., "Constellation to Observe and Deter Adversaries in the Cislunar Environment (CODACE) Final Report," Space Development Agency, 2020. J. J. P. T. W. W. a. C. R. M. D. J. Dichmann, "TRAJECTORY DESIGN FOR THE TRANSITING EXOPLANET SURVEY," 2014. KEYWORDS: information architecture design; spacepower; deterrence; indications & warning; object tracking; real-time data processing; data dissemination; space domain; information exploitation; space domain awareness